EDUCATION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF WAR: THE CASE OF KWAZULU/NATAL

BY

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1994

FOREWORD

In 1994 educationist Heather Jacklin and sociologist Johann Graaff, both from the University of Cape Town, completed reports on rural education in each of the ten the homelands, and then a summary report – eleven reports in all. The overarching title of the set of reports was to have been *Rural education in South Africa: a report on schooling in the Bantustans*. Unfortunately the reports were never published, although photocopies did find their way to some researchers.

The titles and authors of the eleven reports are:

- Final report on homeland education (Jacklin and Graaff)
- Is Bop better? A case-study in educational innovation (Graaff)
- Schooling in KaNgwane (Jacklin)
- Inherit the wind: a report on education in Lebowa (Jacklin)
- Education as an instrument of war: the case of KwaZulu/Natal (Graaff)
- Schooling in KwaNdebele (Jacklin)
- Schooling in the Ciskei (Jacklin)
- Teachers without classrooms: education in Venda (Graaff)
- Klein maar getrain: education in QwaQwa (Graaff)
- Schooling in Gazankulu (Jacklin)
- Rural Education Project report: Transkei (Jacklin)

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Linda Chisholm of the University of Johannesburg was one of the researchers who obtained a ring-bound photocopy of the eleven reports, and she has used them in her own research. She deemed them valuable enough to warrant digitizing, and in 2017 made the suggestion to me by way of her sister Alison (my deputy). Indeed, nothing as comprehensive as these reports had been published on education in the homelands. Further, though unpublished, a number of these reports have been cited.

In 2018 I was given the go-ahead to place them on the Wits institutional repository. Both Heather Jacklin and Johann Graaff readily gave Wits permission to do so. Heather also kindly provided MS Word copies of KwaNdebele and Ciskei, which we could turn into PDFs.

Mark Sandham
Education Librarian
University of the Witwatersrand
August 2018.

NOTE ON THE DIGITIZATION OF THESE REPORTS

The eleven unnumbered reports had not been amalgamated, and each is paginated individually. We have accordingly treated them as individual works. We supplied title pages, a foreword and this note. Where pagination or other details are missing from the photocopy of the manuscript, we have added these to the PDFs. We enclosed such additions in square brackets. Pages 1, 5, 9, 13, 15, 17, and 21 of *Education as an instrument of war: the case of KwaZulu/Natal* were unclear, and we retyped them. The photocopies were reductions to A5 – we have kept them at this size.

The work was all done by the staff of the Wits Education Library.

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EDUCATION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF WAR:
THE CASE OF KWAZULU/NATAL
by Johann Graaff, Sociology, UCT
[This is a preliminary version of the paper and should not be quoted without the author's permission.]

"Thus violence does not affect education as an external phenomenon introduced from outside the structures of education; it has become a key component of the very educational institutions themselves. This happens because African education in Natal is, in itself and by its very nature, a generator of violence and is used as an instrument of war. Therefore education and violence have become inseparable and should be tackled simultaneously. "(Education Monitor, 1992)

1. Introduction

This paper originally set out to address the small matter of education in Kwazulu, and particularly rural education. It soon became apparent, however, that educational issues are quite overshadowed by issues of violence. A number of authors describe Kwazulu/Natal education as being in a state of collapse as a result of the violence. It is quite evident that education cannot continue while the violence continues. It has become necessary therefore to first understand the violence, the links between it and education, and the way in which education contributes to or heals the violence. This paper is therefore not your usual examination of TPR's and CPR's, and teacher qualifications. It starts with a quite extensive discussion of various theories of violence, often at a macro-political level quite removed from education. Its aim is, however, to work its way back to a focus on education.

To start with, then, I argue that education is central to the violence in Natal. On the one hand, it is used by Inkatha as a weapon in its struggle for political hegemony in the region. On the other hand, schoolchildren have been one of the main sources of opposition to Inkatha. A considerable part, although not all, of the struggle in Natal centres around children and schools. If the education crisis in Natal is to be understood and solved, it must be done by understanding and solving violence.

There are various explanations of this violence to hand. Some of these may be dispensed with quite quickly. First, there is nothing 'inherently' violent about either tribal or Zulu culture or Inkatha. By the same token, there is nothing 'inherently' violent about apartheid. It is an important theme of this paper

that the transition to violence by social actors needs explicit investigation. As a general principle, there is nothing 'inherently' violent about any social institution.

Second, it is a little more sophisticated, but only a little, to explain the Natal violence as the attack by the apartheid system and its stooges on the ANC/schoolchildren/trade unions. It is, at the very least, questionable to what extent these stooges are in fact stooges. Furthermore, the violence comes at a time of apartheid's greatest weakness, not its strength.

Third, and here we start on some of the more sophisticated analyses, Pierre du Toit argues that warlordism and the violence that is associated with this is one of a number of institutions which have arisen in the vacuum left by a receding and weakened South African state. His solution is to strengthen the state in the interests both of democracy and civil society. I shall argue that his distinction between 'strong' and 'weak' states is too much of a typology and too little of an explanation to be of much help. Nor is it clear enough on what a 'strong state' means. Finally it does not specify why some institutions and not others have arisen in the 'vacuum'.

Fourth, Craig Charney argues that violence, vigilantism and violence both in South African and Latin America are the result of a lethal mixture of clientelism rooted in a domestic mode of production, capitalism and material poverty. I shall argue that clientelism can arise without the domestic mode of production (whatever that means), but that there is something to be said for the intensity of the confrontation between traditionalist and modern strata in the Durban metropolitan context.

Fifth, Morris & Hindson argue that the timing of the violence and its 'Black on Black' form needs explaining. For them the progressive demise of apartheid's repressive control in the 1980's exposed intercommunal conflicts grown vicious in circumstances of material deprivation. They start out on the task of showing how this viciousness/violence has arisen from otherwise peaceful conditions. This is, to my mind, one of the more sophisticated analyses available at present, but it falls short on the meaning and shape of violence.

William Beinart provides just this missing element. It is not only violence which needs explaining as a social phenomenon, but its particular institutional roots and its subjective meaning. For traditionalist males violence means compensation for wounded male machismo, it means anger at the insolence of children, it means power in circumstances of extreme powerlessness, it means identity amidst anomic poverty, it means camaraderie and excitement, it means theatre and sexual display, it means booty. And there are rural cultural forms of dancing, stick fighting, age-cohort solidarity in which all this is cast.

For children (in as far these sets of meanings can be totally separated) violence means likewise adrenalin and solidarity, it means outrage at smashed educational dreams, it means heroic militarism and sacrifice, it means anarchic aggression and it means material gain. And they have their institutional grounding in the underground movement, in radical literature, in criminal gangs, from streetchildren's forms.

The final section of this paper will begin to consider more fully the implications which these analyses have for educational strategies. These are: informal and basic education to address the needs of school refugees; vocational training for employment; youth movements and national youth services in the areas of development and community work; the institution of legitimate, participative forms in township local government, and school governance; the proper provisioning of school physical infrastructure; the training of teachers. This alongside the socio-economic upliftment of squatter areas, their inclusion in the processes of government, the establishment of viable security and the control of crime. (At the back of this, the ominous question whether the present post-Fordist world system allows such upbeat talk of development and redistribution, and whether violence rooted in the metropolitan margins is not a chronic global phenomenon.(du Toit,1990))

1 Apartheid as Violence

'Understanding violence' needs to be done carefully, though. We should not allow moral disgust at both apartheid and violence to slacken the sinews of intellectual rigour. There are writers who would equate apartheid with violence and see violence suffused like a cancer throughout the body politic. Within this paradigm the notion of violence is expanded to include crime, family violence, corporal punishment, child abuse, family suicide, traffic accidents as well as impossible concepts like structural violence. This leads to unhelpful and vague solutions for the ending of violence, such as 'the abolition of apartheid'. This is not say that various spheres of personal and political life do not interpenetrate, and that there are not continuities both historically and spatially between them. But, if this analysis is to lead to effective mechanisms of healing, a touch more precision is called for.

By way of entry into the debate, and as an example of this somewhat overblown type of analysis, let us consider Nzimande's work. As the author of the quote at the head of this paper, Nzimande holds the view that education is "in itself, and by its very nature, a generator of violence and is used as an instrument of war". What does this mean?

It is Inkatha which uses education as an instrument in its struggle for political hegemony. In 1977 education was

transferred to the control of the Kwazulu government. This
resulted in the introduction of a pro-Inkatha syllabus called
'Ubuntu-botho', the establishment of Inkatha Youth Brigade' and
Youth Service branches at all schools, and the requirement of
signed oaths of loyalty from all civil servants (which naturally
includes teachers) and student holding Kwazulu bursaries. In 1988
the Kwazulu DEC introduced Education Liaison Committees (ELC's)
in 'troublesome' circuits. Members of the ELC's are often local
warlords, KLA members, KZP members and school inspectors.
(Nzimande, 1991:11) Teachers are compelled to join the Inkatha
affiliated Natal African Teachers' Union (NATU) and Inkatha
itself. Teachers and principals are very often appointed to their
positions on the strength of their Inkatha membership. (Gultig
& Hart,:12; Nzimande,1991:11))

Conversely, schools have been one of major sources of resistance
to Inkatha in Natal. Although Natal saw relatively little of the
1976 schools protest, the conflict with Inkatha was initiated
with the Kwamashu schools boycott in 1980, and reached its
highpoint with the Inanda unrest in August 1985 when Inkatha
impi's were sent in to drive schoolchildren back to school. Since
then there has been persistent conflict between Inkatha and
schoolchildren with frequent attacks on schools, and the
harrassment of schoolchildren. The school is, therefore, not just
an instrument of war, but also one of the major sites of war. The
conflict in Natal is, in large measure, a conflict about the
political allegiance of children and teachers.

As a result the education system in Natal has been severely
disrupted. ".. African education in Natal is near collapse."
(Nzimande, 1991:19) In Nzimande & Thusi's sample of
schoolchildren, political violence was the single main reason for
repeating classes, 84% of respondents had had classmates killed,
frequently on the school premises, and political violence was
seen as the most important reason for the closure of schools for
periods of a month or more. Finally, conflict with Inkatha has
led to the dislocation of whole communities. The worst of these
incidents was Pietermaritzburg's "Seven Day War" between 25 March
and 2 April 1990 when 20,000 people among whom 6,000 students
were forced to flee. (Nzimande, 1991:14)

In sum, "It is our argument here that, apart from the deaths and
the destruction of human lives and property, the most devastating
impact of this war in Natal is on education, particularly
schooling." (Nzimande, 1991:2)

'The claimed membership of the Youth Brigade grew from
439,000 to 719,000 between 1985 and 1989. (Seekings, 1993:76)

This should not be read to mean that the only conflict in Natal is between Inkatha and school children who support the ANC. Certainly in Pietermaritzburg, an important dimension of the conflict is the reluctance of Edendale freeholders and tenants to be incorporated into Kwazulu. Whereas elsewhere Inkatha has extended its influence by having black townships brought within Kwazulu boundaries, and/or by the handing over of police stations to the Kwazulu Police, the failure of these mechanisms in Pietermaritzburg has pushed it towards using violence as an alternative. (Gwala, 1989)

For Nzimande, Inkatha is a creature of the apartheid system. Without this system Inkatha would cease to exist. Although Inkatha is dependent for its survival on the bantustan system, that system is counterproductive since it can provide neither the political legitimacy nor the material resources to maintain it. The Kwazulu homeland, by virtue of its homeland status, has insufficient funds for education development. In consequence, the Kwazulu education system is one of the most backward of all the homelands, i.e. it has one of the highest TPR's and CPR's among all the homelands.

Violence is, in part, Inkatha's struggle to exist within the parameters of this dilemma. "The violence in Natal – which to all intents and purposes is an apartheid war against the people, aimed at destabilising the democratic forces – has found an important ally in Inkatha." (Nzimande, 1991:9)

It follows then that the single most important element in a solution to the Natal violence is the elimination of apartheid, and particularly Inkatha and the Kwazulu Department of Education and Culture.

There are, however, other important educational initiatives which are needed to address the situation in Natal beyond the elimination of Inkatha control of schools. The first of these is an extended adult education programme to cater for the thousands of children whose schooling has been disrupted for a period of time and are now too old to return.[1] The second is the

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[1] 'In this suggestion, he follows Gultig & Hart (1990: 12-15) quite closely. He does, however, differ quite sharply from them on the question of the politicisation of schools. Gultig & Hart pay particular attention to the position of teachers. Teachers are caught between hostile pupils, on the hand, and a coercive Inkatha, on the other. They have no teacher's body outside of the Inkatha affiliated NATU to represent their interests. (This was written before the founding of SADTU. "The result is a retreat into the confines of the syllabus and the classroom, and isolation from their pupils." (p. 12) The natural solutions to this through effective teacher organisation or the

assumption by the state of major costs of schooling.

Three comments on Nzimande's analysis. First, it is difficult to discern the exact meaning of the term, apartheid. Does it mean simply Inkatha and/or Kwazulu? or does it mean undemocratic white minority rule? or the use of Black surrogates of white domination? Depending on which one chooses, it makes of South Africa a unique case and loses the comparison with other (Latin American) cases of vigilantism and state-sponsored violence, which Charney makes so well. (See below)

Second, by showing that education is now deeply embroiled in politics, and by postulating that education is always a poltical issue, Nzimande argues that education should not be withdrawn to any degree from the political process, as Hart & Gultig propose. On the contrary, it should play its political role more fully. Nzimande is, I think, confusing two levels of politicization. To say that education is always an issue in politics and between contending interests, is one thing. (And a fairly trite thing at that.) To say that it is always embroiled in violence within the school perimeters, and that it should remain that way, is something quite different.

Thirdly, if the bantustan system was in its origins never intended to provide sufficient resources, and is (therefore?) now incapable of doing it, it becomes impossible to explain how some bantustans have markedly better education systems than others, indeed, why it is a bantustan like Bophuthatswana which has the best black education system in the country. (Graaff, 1993)

Fourthly, there seems to be far too uncomplicated a chain of causation from apartheid (as a single agent) to Inkatha to warlords to violence. There is considerable evidence to show breaks in each of these links. There have, for example, been serious clashes between Buthelezi and certain parts of the NP-run government.' There have, equally, been serious differences

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formation of PTSA's are, in the present context, strategically 'provocative'. They advocate other more low key strategies. This entails an emphasis on democratic processes in schools to counteract the automatic resort to violence in problem-solving.

' As Adam & Moodley (1993:128) argue, Buthelezi has been an uncomfortable ally of the NP government at the best of times. He persisted in resisting independence for the Kwazulu bantustan, he opposed the 1984 tricameral constitution, he continued to call for the release of Mandela as precondition for negotiation, while Buthelezi and PW Botha had a very strained personal relationship.

between Inkatha and particular warlords. Nor is it at all clear that the kind of violence which scares off foreign investment is what the apartheid state wishes. (Adam & Moodley,1993:125)

Finally, and most importantly, how is one in this scenario to make sense of violence which intensifies just as the process of apartheid is crumbling, when the apartheid machine seems to have lost control of large parts of the black population, when, as Morris & Hindson argue, creations of the apartheid system have taken on an independent life of their own. This refers not only to the post-February 1990 and post-election period, but also to the whole of the 1980's during which central pillars of the apartheid machine were being dismantled or had become ineffective. (Morris & Hindson, 1992)

Now, there are a number of extremely detailed and sophisticated analyses about Natal, which themselves are subsets of analyses of violence at the national level, and each of these differs in both detail and in principle from the others. Let us consider each of these.

2 Strong Societies and Weak States

du Toit's analysis is very different from Nzimande's. In this view, violence derives from the failure or weakness of the apartheid, not its purposeful machinations. du Toit draws heavily on a work aptly entitled "Strong Societies and Weak States" by Migdal. In essence he argues that the basic requirement for a strong state is that the various centres of social control in society operate according to a common set of rules, and that they fall within a centralised, pyramidal structure headed by the state.

By contrast, a weak state commonly has competing centres of social control which do not recognize the state's sovereignty. The state is but one among many centres. These centres may be constituted by ethnic groups, political movements or local warlords/strongmen, each of them with or without private armies. In order to function at the regional/local level the state is then pushed into doing deals with these centres, Migdal calls them 'triangles of accommodation', which then strengthens the local centres of power and confirms the state's weakness.

du Toit argues that South Africa is presently threatened by all of these forms. (a) Extremist Afrikaner ethnic groups with their own means of violence question the basic rules of conduct and the legitimacy of the present regime. (b) ANC and NP have fundamentally differing ideas of how government and economy should work. The ANC has been active in setting up alternative centres of government via civics, street committees, people's courts, self-defense units and their armed wing, MK. (c) In other

areas, warlords have established comprehensive control over local areas, and exercise authority of wide areas of social life from political activity, land allocation, housing to education, and security. In order to function at the local level, the state has been drawn into 'triangles of accommodation' with these centres of power, or worse, has clandestinely supported some of them against others. (cf. also du Toit & Gagiano, 1993)

In short, says du Toit, there have been three disconcerting developments in the decade and a half in South Africa. The state has been unable to maintain its sovereignty in the face of crime, rent boycotts, or warlords. South African society has become deeply polarised. And South Africa has become a seriously uncivil society with extremely high levels of violence.

Exrapolating from du Toit, we might say that Natal combines a number of these dimensions. Inkatha is an organisation based on strong ethnic loyalties located within a decentralised homeland structure. It makes use of local warlords who practice their own forms of violence. It has its own private army in the form of the KZP and locally mobilised impi's. It propagates a form of federalism aimed to perpetuate its independence from the central state. It interprets its differences with the ANC in highly emotive terms. It (or parts of it) work in concert with rogue elements of the state security forces. There is widespread criminal acitivity. And violence has become an established form of conflict management. And we might add, going beyond du Toit, that woven into all of this are clear class and generational differences. The state has reached its lowest ebb in Natal.

For du Toit the way to democracy in South Africa lies in (i) establishing the state "as the dominant force over South African society"; (ii) laying down rules of political conduct which do not exacerbate existing conflict or weaken the state (as in proposals for certain kinds of federalism) but promote moderation and compromise; (iii) the construction of an autonomous and competent bureaucracy; and (iv) providing conditions for the growth and strengthening of an autonomous* civil society.

The value of du Toit's analysis is that it rightly indicates the uncivil nature of what is too often regarded as civil society today. Many development agencies, in their concern to involve 'the community' in their projects, have drawn in extremely dubious representatives of those communities, whether these be rogue civics masquerading as ANC branches or warlords

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* du Toit makes the distinction between an autonomous civil society in which the boundaries with the state are clearly demarcated; and an independent civil society which does not recognize the state's sovereignty. (du Toit,1993:6)

masquerading as 'traditional leaders' (cf. Minnaar, 1991: 40). This analysis also indicates the uncivil nature of political movements who, in 'capturing' the state, either at the central, regional or local levels, would deny other parties access to it. All these are extremely dangerous moves for a future South African polity (Chazan, 1991).

However, there are a number of problems with Du Toit. The first and most problematic aspect of this analysis is its failure to examine the origins of weak states. It provides an extremely insightful description of what weak states (and by contrast, strong states) look like. There is a hint in this of a modernisation approach to government which seeks answers to 'developing' polities by contrasting them with 'mature' ones. This provides highly suggestive typologies but tends to be ahistorical and descriptive.

This is particularly problematic in the South African case where Du Toit acknowledges that, though deeply flawed, the South African state was strong at one stage, and has been weakened. This process of weakening has not been examined in this piece. There is no story about how, for example, crucial strategies of 'ungovernability' grew. We shall see that Morris & Hindson below address this issue much more satisfactorily.

Morris & Hindson also point to another element missing here. To say that there are competing centres of power presents the picture in too orderly a fashion, or maybe presents centres of power as too big. Morris & Hindson argue that civics, warlords, lnkatha, ANC are themselves all badly fractured. Particularly ANC-aligned civics and youth organisations have been the target of police and vigilante action. In consequence many of these have broken into multiple bits, each competing for territory in a locality. In some cases it is criminal gangs which have formed and compete with each other. Via Migdal, Du Toit paints a neo-feudal picture of of power centres which contest the state's authority. It is much messier than that (cf. Sita, 1992).

Furthermore, Du Tait's notion of institutions which arise in the space left by the absent or weak state does not say enough about the kind of institutions which arise in this space. It is not just any kind of weed which grows in untended soil. It is important to spell out the historical and cultural origins of particular practices and why they might be amenable to violence. This is one of the strengths of the analysis by Craig Charney, which I examine in the next section.

Secondly, we need a far more precise notion of what a 'strong state' entails. There are at least six different meanings which can be attached to this. A state can be strong in the following senses:

(i) the ability to maintain a monopoly of the means of violence; i.e. the state is able to suppress the existence of private armies, vigilantes, self-defense units or rogue security units (Third Forces) and provide competent policing;

(ii) the ability to sustain a belief in the legitimacy and acceptability of its rule;

(iii) the ability to take initiative and provide leadership; to have confidence in its own policies i.e. the authoritative or confident state; to provide policy guidelines that elicit a cohesive response from politicians and bureaucrats;

(iv) the ability to maintain its autonomy from various interest groups in society; which is not to say that it is unresponsive to representations from interest groups, but rather that it can withstand the use of the state as a source of wealth;

(v) the ability to manage an effective administration; this includes the ability to pursue effective fiscal and budgetary policies, and to provide the legal and physical infrastructure within which civil society and the market can operate;

(vi) the ability to manage an efficient and uncorrupt administration.

In short, strengthening the state can mean a great many different things depending on which meaning one chooses. The same exercise of interrogation could be done in following through du Toit's other proposal, to strengthen civil society. And from doing both these exercises it also becomes clear that civil society cannot be strong without a strong state, and vice versa. Civil society cannot develop in any viable sense unless the state provides the legal, physical, financial, and security infrastructure. Conversely, the state cannot be strong in many of the above senses unless civil society is strong. The theory of the 'soft state', for example, relies on the fact that an underdeveloped bourgeoisie uses the state as a means of accumulation.

[In passing we may note that it is quite unlikely that the present state, at any of its levels, will achieve many of the above levels of 'strength' in the short term. The problems of rebuilding administrative structures, reformulating policy, redirecting incumbent bureaucrats and training new ones and their political leaders all point to considerable confusion in the transitional period. Conversely, attempts to strengthen government by drawing personal from political parties, trade unions and NGO's will serve to substantially weaken civil society. In short, we shall in the transitional period sit with both a weak, though temporarily legitimate, state, and a weakened civil society.]

3 Clientelism and the Lineage Mode

For Charney the heart of the matter lies in clientelism. "Inkatha, along with the Kwazulu homeland it controls, represents the most comprehensive system of clientelism in South Africa." (p.10) Clientelism is a system of administration and legitimacy based on bonds of (extended) family, friendship, clan or other personal ties rather than universalistic criteria of citizenship. In South Africa clientelism has found fertile soil in the explicit maintenance of the lineage mode of production (tribalism) by the apartheid system in rural areas, and its extension into urban areas. Urban manifestations of this policy are to be found in the migrant labour system, hostel and mine compounds and the emphasis on ethnic identity. Township institutions reflect these policies, for example, not only in compound and hostel cultures, but homeboy groups and township 'big men'.

When residues of a lineage mode exist within capitalism along with a scarcity of material resources, clientelism is the organisational form which arises. Individuals are regarded as clients of a particular patron with reciprocal bonds of loyalty and tribute rendered in exchange for scarce material resources. This was the authority form which prevailed in South African townships throughout the 1960's and early 1970's and was substantially responsible for containing political disaffection during that time.

Violence arises as a response by patrons whose position of power is threatened. Violence is rooted in an actively maintained warrior tradition, in male machismo and in the absence of democratic channels. Violence moves into a new dimension when local patrons under threat receive support from security forces of the central state, itself also under threat.

By recasting the analysis of violence in this way, Charney is able to put the South African case in a wider context, and draw parallels with Latin American and African examples (as Nzimande is not).

But there are serious problems here, too. First, what is one to make of a (lineage) mode of production in which very little is produced? which is dependent for its survival on pension payments and migrant remittances? which has not since the early 20th century been able to ensure its own reproduction? (cf. Guy, 1982)

Charney's argument makes a lot more sense if one abandons the notion of a mode of production and thinks instead of the persistence of cultural forms. It is certainly true that the institution of chieftainship has survived in Kwazulu in far stronger form than in any other homeland, if for no other reason than that the Zulu king is still a central figure. To invert the title of Jeff Guy's well-known book, the destruction of the Zulu

kingdom has not gone nearly as far as it has elsewhere'. Literature from Bophuthatswana, for example, depicts chiefs as marginalised, indigent and impotent. Nor is there anything in Bophuthatswana which compares with the Zulu impi.

Furthermore, as a politician Buthelezi has shown far greater energy and creativity than any other bantustan leader. Whatever one thinks of 'great man' history, Buthelezi is a different calibre of leader than Lennox Sebe, Lucas Mangope, or Kaiser Matanzima. A great part of this organisational energy and political entrepreneurship has gone into fanning the flames of Zulu nationalism.

Finally, barring the Ciskei, there is no bantustan which spatially intrudes as far into a metropolitan area as Kwazulu does into the Durban Functional Region. Zulu traditionalism and urban modernity confront each other here in an explicit and tangible way. (Adam & Moodley, 1993:142) (The nearest equivalent of the sprawling township and squatter areas abutting a metropolis is the Odi/Moretele area north of Pretoria. But despite the provocations of the Bophuthatswana police against 'non-Tswana's', the area has not produced anything like the unrest which Kwamashu or Umlazi has.)

Second, how is one to understand clientelism which persists under undiluted capitalism, as it does in southern Italy, or did in the infamous South African departments of Development Aid, and Education and Training? In other words, 'the lineage mode' is not the only possible or even the main root of clientelism, as Charney proposes. (White) It seems that poverty, the absence of state services, and popular distrust of official institutions are in themselves powerful, if not sufficient reasons for the rise of clientelism.

It may also be more appropriate not to talk of clientelism but simply corruption. There is a significant literature which avoids patrimonialism (a synonym for clientelism) and culture in the explanation of corruption, violent or non-, in favour of situational constraints. (Geddes & Neto, 1992; Diamond, 1993) Diamond (1993) argues that corruption in government is likely to arise in situations where opportunities for it exist, where the risk is low and need is great. Opportunities increase as the tasks allocated to government increase. This is the reason for privatisation and the use of NGO's by funders in Third World situations. The risks are low in the absence of, or collusion with the police. The need is high in situations of economic deprivation and political powerlessness.

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⁵ Guy, J (1982) The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom. Ravan. Johannesburg.

I would add that corruption is likely also where the stakes are excessively high. In the Kwazulu situation, the stakes are the elimination of the bantustan system and all the jobs and the political power that go with that. The stakes are considerably heightened by situations of extreme conflict where the possibilities for compromise appear hopeless.

Lastly, casting Natal violence as a defensive action of a threatened petite bourgeoisie ignores the (violent) desperation of those on the margins of survival or of those who are nothing more than criminals. Violence has no single root or type. It is a beast with many heads.

4. The Demise of Apartheid

Morris & Hindson (1992) frame their argument against the background of two questions: ". . . why is this (violence) occurring now when apartheid is in demise rather than 15 or 20 years ago when it was at its peak? Furthermore, why in a society where whites historically have dominated and oppressed blacks, often violently, are black people killing each other rather than whites?"

Their answer hinges on two factors. First, under classical apartheid violence was held in check by 'overwhelming state force' and an extensive and detailed bureaucratic surveillance of wide areas of African life. This system of control hid extensive antagonisms in urban areas between formal townships, hostels and squatter communities, between unionised, employed working classes, growing middle classes and the ever expanding unemployed. As the apartheid control structure starts to fragment during the 1980's and particularly after Feb 1990, these conflicts explode unchecked. "The larger conflict being played out now is essentially about which racial groups, social classes and strata will have their interests best secured in a future political and economic dispensation". (p. 45)

Hindson, Byerley & Morris (1993) spell out this process in some detail for Durban region. They see the violence in the region as going through three stages:

(i) state-people violence in the early 1980's centred around black townships in city core areas, Lamontville, Chesterville, Clermont;

(ii) intercommunal violence in the mid- to late 1980's of a much more extensive nature centred in the rapidly expanding squatter areas on the city's periphery and aggravated by political division between Inkatha and the UDF/ANC; and

(iii) third-force violence in the early 1990's perpetrated by a variety of groups ranging from returning Umkonto we Sizwe cadres, and covert security force elements to Inkatha

hitmen, Kwazulu Police elements and white extremists.

For Morris & Hindson's argument it is the second stage which is crucial. In this stage there are a number of community divisions which elicit violence: ethnic conflict between Zulu and Pondo; township vs hostel; township vs shack area; shack area vs shack area; and even township vs township. The most serious division, however, is that between UDF/ANC supporting youth in townships and Inkatha supporting warlords in shack areas. The youth are particularly amenable to participation in violence since unemployment is especially high among the youth, and the Kwazulu administration control all township schools, barring those in the city core. (Hughes, 1987:342,347) During this period the state security forces cede control over many of these areas to the Kwazulu Police, since these townships and shack areas now fall within Kwazulu.[*]

Their basic theme is restated as follows. "Untrammelled competition for basic resources in the context of the collapse of local government, the reduction of state assistance for housing and transport, and shrinking resource base for residential life created ideal conditions for communal mobilisation around access to, and control over, these resources." (Hindson et al.,1993:16)

So much for the timing of the violence. Why is violence not directed against whites? Both spatially and politically whites exhibit considerable cohesion. The state has continued to pump ample resources into white (and Indian and Coloured) residential areas. In contrast, rapidly expanding African townships, and particularly shack areas, have been starved of resources. ".. so that instead of the conflict taking place over the distribution of resources generally, it is taking place over the distribution of marginal resources left over for black residential areas whose inhabitants are rapidly expanding but with no parallel expansion of resources being made available to them." (p.43)

If the violence is not directed at Whites, why is it insufficient to say that the violence is simply the result of political competition between Inkatha and the ANC? The reason for this, say Morris & Hindson, is that there is far more at stake than merely political ideology? For a start, shacklords and warlords who are now aligned with Inkatha, have not always been so. They have, in the present circumstances, found it convenient to draw on

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[*] Hughes's interpretation of the Inanda riot places considerable emphasis on the central state's provocation of group divisions by, inter alia, threats of squatter removals, on tenant-landlord friction and also on Black-Indian hostility. (Hughes, 1987)

resources which Inkatha can deliver. But they have an independent existence and a separate set of interests which, in particular cases, has clashed with those of Inkatha.[1] That makes them difficult to predict and control for Inkatha.

The same problem is experienced by the ANC organisation. Local civics respond to local conflicts and interests, and though they might find it profitable to draw on ANC resources at times, at other times they go their own way. In recent times the boundary between criminal and political activity has been frequently breached.

If there are 'competing power centres' within Inkatha and ANC civics, similar conditions apply within the central and bantustan state. The absence of a grand plan, the conflict between factions, and the competition between various government departments has led to considerable confusion within and between state institutions. This has allowed space for local initiatives, and in a more ominous way, spawned splinter-groups from the various security operations.

Why have these various antagonisms produced violence? Morris & Hindson hint at a number of answers to this question: the example set by state security forces over many decades; the ideologies of ungovernability and armed struggle symbolized in the AK47 by the liberation movements; the porous boundary between political action and apolitical crime; the traditionist and disciplinarian regimes maintained by township warlords; and the desperation of people struggling for survival.

What are the solutions to his situation? They are both political and socio-economic. At the political level, agreements of cooperation, or peace accords need to be fashioned at all possible levels – central, regional and local – to combat the fragmented nature of [the] conflict. Basic to these agreements are codes of rules on conflict resolution. Morris & Hindson also call for the control and disarmament of local armies, and the reform of the police and judicial systems.

At the socio-economic level the most fundamental roots of the violence can be addressed. That means the reintegration of marginalised populations into the economy and politics of the

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[1] Hughes mentions the case of Rogers Ngcobo, "the most prominent African landlord" in Inanda, who clashed with Inkatha in the early 1980's and resigned his position. She also mentions the case of Thomas Shabalala, the notorious warlord of Lindelani, whose father was a gangster in the old Cato Manor. Shabalala is, in other words, not simply an Inkatha creation. (Hughes, 1987: 343)

country via substantial infrastructural development of squatter and shack areas. A Neo-Liberal solution which creates space for an expanded non-racial middle-class but excludes the remaining 50% of the population will only entrench the existing conflict.

By way of comment on Morris & Hindson we may note three things. First, their analysis is based on conflict in urban areas. It does say much help rural areas where violence is equally prevalent although the body-count might not be as high (Ainslie:107-127). Second, Morris & Hindson do take some trouble to spell out why violence should follow from conflict. They say very little about the meaning of violence; and the institutional, historical roots of viiolence. Finally, they say very little about strengthening the state. Their analysis is solely about the origins of the conflict and how this might be solved. du Toit's analysis and this one have exactly reciprocal blind spots. Each omits what the other sees.

5 Cycles and Continuities

It has become commonplace to say that 'violence feeds on itself', that there are 'spirals of violence' which develop their own momentum beyond the original causes and often beyond the originators' intentions. But there are a great many senses in which these statements are true. Let us spell those out here.

First, the most obvious sense in which violence becomes self-perpetuating is the cycle of vengeance which is established in the absence of conflict-resolving mechanisms. But we should understand 'conflict-resolving mechanisms' in a wider sense. In its simplest sense this refers to judicial procedures where community authorities take up individual issues and put them into slower and broader context, where the interest of the community and the community-context is brought into play alongside that of individuals and families. But it goes beyond this as well. For conflict-resolution is, as Durkheim pointed out a long time ago, also about the ritual of public anger, formalised vengeance, about punishment - albeit within reasonable limits. In the absence of social structures to accommodate these emotional needs, conflict leads to violence, and violence becomes uncontained. 'Rational' violence exorcises the heat of personal vengeance.

Second, and related to the above point, is the effect of the fragmentation of social structures through the elimination, detention, assassination, or flight of leaders. Where there was one organisation in the past with space for a variety of membership, there are now many, each of them in conflict with others. And with each further level of fragmentation, the conflict issues have become more individualised, more vengeful. The loss of leadership has meant the loss of longer-term vision, principled action, reasoned discourse, a descent to the lowest

Common denominator, a criminalisation of political institutions. Sitas uses the metaphor of an organisational octopus whose severed legs then each spawn new smaller organisations. (Sitas, 1992)

Third, in numerous cases violence has 'cleansed' communities of the membership of opposing factions. In the past an area may have contained members of both factions in conflict, and even in many cases blurred the edges of it. The effect of the conflict in many cases has been to enforce uniformity of loyalty in an area by forcing members of opposing factions to flee. Thus we find the rise of Inkatha or ANC areas which are for the opposing faction effectively no-go areas. Political affiliation has become a determinant of where you live.

Fourth, if the condition, or malcondition, of schooling has been a contributory root of youth discontent, the violence has only served exacerbate that by its destruction of schooling. As we have seen above, much of the violence in Natal is focussed on schoolchildren. Much of it results in the closure of schools, the flight of schoolchildren and teachers to other areas or other schools. If bantu education was in crisis in the early 1980's, there are few words to describe it now.

The same argument applies to the scarcities of other facilities in townships and squatter communities. If violence has, in part, been a competition for scarce resources, it has worsened that competition by the destruction of resources like houses, shops, cars and taxis and male bread winners.

Fifth, the duration and intensity of violence in Natal, as elsewhere, has produced institutional and cultural sedimentations which will not be easy to excise. What effort will it take to bring the criminalised 'comtotsis' back into political organisations and/or even (non-formal) education? One might remove the legal bantustan structures which spawned Inkatha, but, contrary to Nzimande's prediction, this will not make Inkatha disappear. We may now have shackland warlords sitting in parliament, but this will not transform them into your conventional baby-kissing constituency MP. Just as the cultural forms, as I shall argue below, so also they will have continuities into the future.

Sixth, in many places, violence originated in small-scale local issues which had been exacerbated and inflamed by the incompetence, anxieties and/or malice of local apartheid officials (Hughes, Aitchison). In common parlance, these small-scales situation have become 'politicised'. What these means is that they have each been stitched into a larger patchwork, feeding into broader national organisational and ideological networks and drawing strength from them. Thus, for example,

larger political organisations have been able to offer considerable organisational advantages to small-scale players. Local issues (which may have started out cast in an anti-apartheid discourse) have been reformulated into ethnic, generational, urban-rural forms. In some parts this umbrella context has fragmented again and lapsed into localised criminal activity.

Finally, the arrival of an ANC government may in Natal serve to anchor the intercommunal nature of violence. If anything, the removal of Whites from central government will tend to anchor the violence in intercommunal form as disappointed expectations are inflamed, and are eventually redirected at government incumbents who now happen to be Black.

6 The Subjective and Institutional Roots of Violence

Three questions to be addressed in this section. One, why is violence the response in a particular situation rather than passivity or hopelessness? Two, what does violence mean to those that participate in it? And three, what are the historical and cultural origins of these (violent) institutions and practices? Without answers to these questions, one is left with broad functionalist analysis with too many gaps.

Let us start with the question of the meaning of violence. The temptation in much analysis is to assume that the texture of violence can be read off its structural form. If, for example, we say that conflict arises from political conflict, then we assume that ANC-aligned individuals hate and despise those aligned with Inkatha, and there is no more to be said about it.

And yet it needs emphasizing that neither political competition nor economic survival necessarily or unviversally produces violent behaviour, and that violence can be clothed in many meanings. It needs to be spelt out how violence arises in these contexts. Part of such explanation lies in unpacking the particular meaning of violence. It is not sufficient to rely on broad 'structuralist' explanation*. Beinart encapsulates both

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* In explaining why he found it unnecessary in writing about education in Kwazulu to interview senior Inkatha education officials, Maré writes,"It is because I do not believe that history is ultimately made by 'great men' that I have not interviewed the 'two most senior policy makers in Inkatha'." (Maré, 1988/9:144)

Another way to bypass the meaning attached to violence is the 'deindividuation' or mob psychosis theory which has featured in a number of state trials. In this approach individuals are thought to be swept away by the mood of the crowd, and to lose

these points well. "While much .... public violence stems from conflict, by no means all conflict results in violence. Violence requires particular forms of agency..." (p.471)(my own emphasis) Put differently, violence has many different meanings. We need to specify which of these applies in particular situations.

Concrete evidence from Kwazulu is unfortunately fairly sparse. So let us consider some examples of institutional roots from a wider history and spread. First, while much consideration of violence has been concerned to counter the colonial stereotypes of inherently 'savage natives', there are institutional forms which have carried over from rural contexts and adapted to urban situations. These are often fighting and dancing groups which have served to socialize young men in tribal society. In these rural situations, says Beinart, "male leisure took the form of fighting, even if half the art was to learn how to stop" (Beinart, 1992:476). In township situations these groups persisted, changing weapons, uniforms or enemies. In cases where the containing institutional framework within which these operated broke down, they degenerated into quite destructive forms.

Second, there is ample evidence of a very porous boundary between political and criminal activity. Some individuals who had been members of gangs prior to the 1984-5 unrest, were pulled into the political struggle during this time, and reverted back to them with the onset of negotiations. They speak of the "excitement of violence, the camaraderie of the fighting party, the fear they struck into others as they moved.." These comtsotsi's replaced the state with the community as their enemy. Other criminal forms have been shaped on the mine compounds and prisons, or drawn on more traditional sources. (Beinart, 1992:473)

Third, Seekings notes the case of young people for whom the violence of the mid-1980's was enormously exciting and exhilarating without much grasp of the political issues involved.

> "They joined for their enjoyment - not really out of real understanding of the issues and certainly not to work. They were attracted by the slogans and the songs. They enjoyed the toyi-toyi and the singing and throwing stones and the running away from the police." (Seekings,1993:63 quoting Straker)

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all individual will. As Manganyi argues, it is not that people are transformed into hypnotized animals in a crowd context. It is far more that certain of their dispositions, often politically motivated, which normally remain hidden, are driven to the fore in such situations. (Manganyi, 1990)

For some young people this was a passing moment in their lives. It was a time of entertainment and did not influence them greatly.

Fourth, there are a number of ways in which poverty undermines feelings of masculine adequacy, and leads from there into both family and public violence. Campbell argues that a low income makes it impossible for township men to play the roles of household provide and leader. "I always feel like a father who is a failure, who is not commanding dignity and respect in his family - because I can't afford to satisfy their needs." (Campbell, 620) In addition, rapidly changing social conditions and the higher educational levels of a younger generation deflates the authority of parents, and particularly fathers. Children then see their elders as ignorant and uneducated. "Parents appear as fools to their children, people who just say useless things, whose minds have simply ceased to think .." (Campbell, 620) An important element in conservative Inkatha vigilantism, then, was the expression of anger by elder men at cheeky, upstart children who needed to be taught a lesson. Also at an individual level, male and patriarchal frustration leads to assault, alcohol abuse and infidelity. For Campbell there is no clear boundary between family and political violence. Aggression against your own children easily translates into aggression against cheeky children at large. (cf. also Adam & Moodley, 1993:140)

Adam & Moodley push this principle one step further by focussing on the impact of political impotence and its link with violence. "The more powerless people are, the more they become obssessed with the symbols of power." (Adam & Moodley, 1993:145) Also clientelism "thrives with rightlessness".

Fifth, says Campbell, the resistance movement has confirmed the link between masculinity and violence. The ideology of the 'armed struggle', the romance of MK and the AK47, the militarism of the movement, the heroism of sacrifice, the ideology of ungovernability and 'Liberation before Education' have all sanctioned and encouraged the resort to violence.

> "We have our heroes who suffered, our heroes did not become fat behind offices and payouts. We are fighters." (quoted in Sitas, 1992:635) *

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* While Sitas refers in an earlier publication to Inkatha as 'moral rearmament' and its roots in urban anomie (Sitas, 1986), in this work he explicitly rejects that via Touraine, 1983, 1981 and Tilly, 1978. Also M Bosman, ASSA 1990 (Stellenbosch); and M Marks ASSA Pretoria, 1992. Here he uses the notion of contranomie to denote the active creation of culture even in conditions of severe social dislocation.

". . . I know that one day I will be killed by the bullet of the Boer or by their puppets. This means that I will die young. I have devoted myself to being a comrade, so there is no need to be afraid. I am not afraid of anything."(quoted in Campbell, 1992: 624) (cf. also Morris & Hindson)

7. How can Education Help? Preliminary Notes

At the base of the violence, then, lie economic deprivation, powerlessness, social fragmentation, urban-rural and intergenerational polarisation, a corrupt, weakened and ineffectual state, militarisation, all overlaid by political ideology. This is a forbidding list of ills, and education planners should be extremely careful in what they aim at. Whether education can or should be addressing any of these is a discussion beyond the scope of this paper. What follows are some prefatory remarks as a basis for further research.

(i) Education is one of the range of basic resources in short supply among marginalised populations at the fringes of South African metropolitan areas. If, as Morris & Hindson argue, competition for these resources is fundamental to the conflict, then access and availability of schools can do a significant amount to lessen intercommunal conflict.

(ii) An overlapping root of violence in education is the outrage which children feels at the inadequacy of school facilities, the incompetence and corruption of teachers, the administrative confusion around textbooks and exams, the costs of schooling. Schoolchildren's anger at 'gutter education' was, in Natal, what brought Inkatha impi's initially into the conflict.

Education needs to be rehabilitated as a competent, legitimate and honest undertaking. It is perhaps the single institution which carries the highest aspirations in a time of disillusionment. When children have lost faith in their parents, they have nothing but schools to fall back on. When they lose their faith in schools, there is nowhere else for them to go but the street.

(iii) Peace accords at national, regional and local levels must be replicated at school level. The issues between parents, children and teachers need to be brought within institutionalised conflict-resolution mechanisms. Hart & Gultig argue that PTSA's are important institutions here. Also, democratic processes need to become part and parcel of teaching methods. (Hart & Gultig, 1990)

(iv) Non-formal, basic education and vocational training for

those who, through the violence, have had their school careers cut short.

(v) School-based channels for dealing with traumatic after-effects of violence - psychodrama, support groups, counselling.

(vi) Vocationally oriented youth organisations to tap into and contain the strands of militarism, sacrifice, excitement, display - all evident in children's discourses. The origins of youth organisations in countries elsewhere in Africa was rooted in two aspects: the demobilisation of youth who had been part of the independence/liberation movements; and the disillusionment of schoolleavers who could find no employment. Either way there was a strong economic component in this. (cf. Graaff, 1980) Whatever else they do, youth organisations must be job-oriented.

Colin Bundy's carefully constructed and now famous quote emphasizes this aspect of students' discontent in 1985. "Take political rightless, socially subordinate, economically vulnerable youths; educate them in numbers beyond their parents' wildest dreams, but in grotesquely inadequate institutions; ensure that their awareness is shaped by punitive social practices in the world beyond the schoolyard - and then dump them in large numbers on the economic scrap-heap." (Bundy, 1987)

By way of antidote to this 'overblown' form of analysis, then, a number of pointed questions.'"

(i) how does the violence in Natal in the last 15 years distinguish itself from other areas and times; what is particular about Natal which distinguishes it from, for example, Crossroads in Cape Town in 1986, or Kwandebele in 1987, or the East Rand.

(ii) what are the roots of violence in this particular time and place? whose interests are served by it? what are the advantages and disadvantages of violence as a strategic political response?

(iii) why is violence the response rather than other forms of social behaviour? how does violence 'attach' itself to existing cultural forms and practices?

(iv) what is the social meaning of 'violence'? is it necessarily a destructive, punitive, persecutory meaning? conversely, is it necessarily a form of 'resistance' to 'oppression'?

(v) what are the non-political origins of violence in this region?

(vi) how do 'the youth' or schoolchildren connect into this?

(vii) what can schools do about it?

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[10] It is interesting to note that while radical analysis has strenuously searched for causes of Black violence which would avoid easy racist prejudice, not much has been done to rescue the more manichean analyses of the apartheid system and its violence.(Adam & Moodley, 1993:130)

Matric Pass Rates for African Students 1976-1988

Year	Total Pass %	Exemption %
1976	84,8	25,2
1978	76,2	33,0
1980	53,2	15,7
1982	50,8	10,5
1984	50,1	11,5
1986	51,4	13,4
1988	56,7	16,4
1990	36,4	7,4

(Source:Nzimande.p.44)

Note on age discrepancies between boys and girls schools- boys on average much older than girls - possibly because girls leave mostly for reasons of teenage pregnancy. Once they have left this is for good, while boys can keep coming back. (Nzimande, 32)

See Mdluli for reference to 1980 vigilantes attacking students on the grounds that they "did not want to listen to their parents". (Nzimande, 1991:5)

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